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The Department of Defense (DOD) is under increasing
pressure to purchase defense systems and subsystems which,
have been developed abroad. There are many unique issues
to be considered before making a decision to purchase a
foreign developed defense system (subsystem). The Congress
and GAO have become increasingly critical of DOD's efforts
in this area.
In this thesis, a conceptual model focusing on four
major issue areas, Y-, : Changes in NATO Defense Capability,
Y2 : Real II. S. Costs, Y,: Economic Effects, and Y,: Politi-
cal Benefits, is developed to assist DOD personnel in con-
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The United States and its NATO allies are attempting to
realize a more effective and economical military alliance
by implementing a policy of Rationalization/Standardization
and Interoperability (R/S&I) regarding weapons development
and procurement efforts. As a result of this policy, an era
of previously unparalleled effort in the area of cooperative
weapons development has evolved. The resulting trade agree-
ments have resulted in a flow of technology and arms that
has given rise to the term "Two-Way-Street. " This is in
reference to the fact that not only is Europe buying tech-
nology and arms from the U. S. but that the U. S. is in turn
purchasing technology and arms from Europe.
In support of this policy, both the Congress and the
Department of Defense (DOD) have passed the appropriate
legislation and have made the necessary policy statements to
firmly establish the fact that each takes the objectives
of R/S&I seriously. Despite all the verbage to the contrary,
however, Congress and the DOD are not in full agreement
regarding the benefits to be gained by this policy. Nor
are they in agreement in regard to the direction or magnitude
this effort should assume. Consequently, some of the systems
selected by the DOD in support of this policy are being met




This dilemma provides the "basis for the research
question of this study: Can a model he developed which,
when applied within the current framework of systems acqui-
sition, will satisfy the information needs of Congress and
thus assure a reasonable certainty of acquisition approval?
2. The Objective
The objective, therefore, is to determine if such
a model may be developed and, if so, to present it as a
supplement to the current process. What is needed is a
model or framework which, when applied to selecting European
systems, draws together the various peripheral considerations
of the decision process and which insures that the informa-
tion needs of all concerned are treated.
3. The Scope
The model should aim at addressing not only the cost
effectiveness measures which are accentuated in the current
process, but should address the impact of economics and
politics as well. It should call upon the experience of as
many people as is feasible, not just on the in-house experts.
This is particularly necessary if any measure of objectivity
is to be obtained.
Also, the model should be useful in application
during the entire selection process. That is, it should
serve equally in the screening of candidate systems as well

as in the recommendation for production. This is necessary
to insure that the U. S. is not unwittingly committed to the
selection of a system as a result of some off-set agreement
or as the result of political expediency.
4. Assumptions
Basic to this model are the assumptions that a clear
and definite need, in the form of a Mission Element Needs
Statement (MENS), has "been approved prior to any candidate
"being considered. Also, it is assumed that the available
information will improve in quality as the process of selec-
tion proceeds. Additionally, it is assumed that the reader
is familiar with the DSARC process and the Major Systems
Acquisition Process as outlined in OMB Circular A- 109 and
DODINST 5000,1 and 5000,2.
5. limitations
It must be acknowledged that this study does not
enjoy the input of members of the European industrial
community since resources and time prohibited their active
involvement. Additionally, time and the limited number of
MENS so far approved, have not permitted a field test of
this study.
6. Organization
In presenting the proposed model for consideration,
Chapter One deals with the background of R/S&I. The
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following chapters will deal, in order, with, the methodology,
the model, an application, and finally the conclusions and
recommendations which arise.
B. KEY DEFINITIONS
Before proceeding any further, a few of the key defini-
tions that will be used throughout this paper should be
addressed.
1. R/S&I
The term R/S&I refers to Rationalization/Standardiza-
tion and Interoperability. These three terms are used to de-
scribe an objective which is expected, once realized, to
result in a significant increase in the ability of NATO to
efficiently defend itself. To more clearly explain the
terms, each will be addressed individually.
a. Rationalization
DOD Directive 2010.6, Standardization and Inter-
operability of Weapon Systems and Equipment Within the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 11 Mar 77, states that
rationalization is: "Any action that increases the effective-
ness of alliance forces through more efficient and effective
use of defense resources committed to the alliance." /j8:5J





DOD Directive 2010.6 goes on to define standardi-
zation as:
"The process by which member nations achieve the closest
practicable cooperation among forces; the most efficient
rise of research, development, and production resources;
and agree to adopt on the broadest possible basis the
use of: (1) common or compatible operational, adminis-
trative and logistics procedures; (2; common or compatible
technical procedures and criteria; (3) common, compatible
or interchangeable supplies, components, weapons or equip-
ment; and (4) common or compatible tactical doctrine with
corresponding organizational compatibility." Q3:5-§)
c. Interoperability
Again from DOD Directive 2010.6. one finds
interoperability defined as: "the ability of systems, units
or forces to provide services to and accept services from
other systems, units or forces and to use the services so
exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.
"
[8:6]
2. Not Invented Here (NIH)
While NIH is not a term which will be used as part
of the model, it is important to understand its emotional
implications as they pertain to the R/S&I process. In
essence, the term refers to any aversion that exists within
the military establishment to the use of systems and weapons
designed and/or manufactured abroad. For the purpose of
this study, this aversion will be assumed to be of mi.Tumal
concern or impact as was determined in one study which stated
that NIH:
"...manifests itself in four major areas of concern:
foreign product technology; adequacy of foreign technology;
12

timeliness of foreign suppliers in meeting shipment
schedules and the dependability of foreign sources
to meet continuing needs, [l: 62^
The study went on to find, however, that for the most part
these concerns were ill founded. (l:62j
With respect to quality, the study found, "...that
in most cases, these products were equal to or better than
some items purchased domestically." [l:63j Likewise, with
respect to technology, the study found, "...that modern
manufacturing processes, particularly in Europe, were capa-
ble of producing selected items that were superior to domes-
tic products." £l:65} Regarding timeliness, the study
determined, "...that foreign companies, with proper controls,
could be held to the same standards required of U. S.
companies." [1:650 Finally, concerning the problem of
dependability, the study discovered, "...that foreign sources
generally can be depended upon to support their equipment
adequately. " jl: 67J
B. BACKGROUND
In the past, as much by intuition as by design, the DOD
has chosen to observe classical location theory when selecting
a source for its weapon systems. Accordingly, it has tended
to avail itself of sources of supply that were close at hand,
namely the U. S. arms industry.
Motivated by the desire to maintain an economically
vital arms industry at home and by the demands of strong
labor organizations, Congress aided in perpetuating this
13

tendency by passing, on March 3, 1933, the "Buy American
Act" which required that those goods purchased for the use
of our armed forces be procured from U. S. sources. When
this act was passed, however, the results of an as yet
unfought World War and the exigencies of the ensuing "Cold
War" could not "be anticipated.
Following World War II and the ensuing threat posed by
the resulting power vacuum in Western Europe and the presence
of a militarily superior Soviet Army in Eastern Europe, an
initially subtle change in U. S. weapons acquisition poli-
cies "began to take shape. The vehicle for that change was
born with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on
April 4, 1949.
The treaty was signed by the twelve original signatories
in order "...to promote stability and well being in the
North Atlantic area" and to, "...unite their efforts for
collective defense and for the preservation of peace and
security." (3:302^
The particular part (or section) of the Treaty which is
of interest in light of R/S&I is Article 3 which states:
"...the parties, separately and jointly, by means of
continuous and effective self help and mutual aid, will
maintain and develop their individual and collective
capacity to resist armed attack." [3:303j
It is this article, and in particular the words, "collective
capacity", which first states the need for reconciliation of
military requirements within the NATO alliance. This was
interpreted to include the area of arms and equipment. In
1952, the Temporary Council Committee determined that the
14

interest of NATO necessitated:
"...correlating production programs of major end items
of equipment, including aircraft, artillery, small arms,
radar and wireless sets, vehicles, ships and various
types of ammunition." (^:13^
Though initial efforts were limited, in as much as no
master plan was developed, - a weakness which exists to
this day - numerous roadblocks and pitfalls existed, such
as an early version of the "not invented here" (NIH) syndrome
and a reluctance to finance multi-national projects.
Additionally, the great disparity in economic and industrial
efficiencies "between member countries as well as fears of
breaches in security made initial efforts less than success-
ful. B:133
As long as NATO maintained a technological and economic
advantage over the Soviet Union, little impetus existed to
press the need for the "collective capacity" called for in
the Treaty. Indeed, it was sufficient for each country to
develop its armed forces in a manner consistent with its
own economies and priorities and with the degree of over-
sight exercised by the respective legislative body. In
essence, the strength of the alliance had permitted,
"...placing the economic interests of each independent
nation above the interests of a strong and effective
alliance." [4:66}
One should not think, however, that progress was not
made. In fact standardization was achieved in the speci-
fication of various explosives, ammunition, vehicle compo-
nents, impact tests, ballistics standards and conversion
15

standards as well as aviation fuels and refueling fittings.
However, a great deal of this standardization was forced
by the fact that the majority of the arms supplied to the
NATO countries came from the U. S. , since the arms indus-
tries in Europe were initially in shambles. Furthermore,
a significant part of the funding for rebuilding European
arms industry came in the form of grants-in-aid aimed at
developing the ability to manufacture spares for the U. S.
designed systems then in use.
This arrangement soon proved not to be inviolate,
however. Soon, the European arms industry began to supply
an increasingly larger proportion of its own arms require-
ments, and in turn, began to actively develop its own ex-
port markets. Accordingly, except in those areas requiring
the most advanced technology and large capital investment,
Europe began to shun U. S. manufactured weapons in favor
of its own products.
To a certain extent, European countries began to resent
the dominance of the U. S. arms industry in NATO. As a
result, NATO now resembles a conglomeration of disparate
parts rather than an efficient and mutually supporting
defensive entity. As an example:
"...there are deployed among the NATO military forces
today at least 7 basic models of tanks; 23 types of
combat aircraft; over 100 types of tactical missile
systems; multiple guns of different caliber and a host
of different types of radars 36 in NATO's navies
alone. Some guns of the same caliber cannot fire the
same ammunition; aircraft with diverse ordnance and fuel
requirements can only rearm or refuel at certain airfields;
and commanders have experienced difficulties in communi-




What makes this particularly worrisome is the fact that
during this same period the Warsaw Pact, being totally domi-
nated by the Soviet Union, has increasingly standardized
its forces to the extent that, except for varying degrees
of modernization, each country employs arms which are totally
standardized and interoperable with those of the other members
of the alliance.
Making this situation even less agreeable is the fact
that whereas NATO formerly enjoyed a vast technological
superiority to the Warsaw Pact countries, at the present
time that advantage is nearly, if not certainly, eroded.
As stated by Dr. William Perry:
"...the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have focused
not on independence and consumer goods for their citi-
zens, but on monolithic power building. The Soviets
have been spearheading this effort, having increased
their defense expenditures at a compound rate of 3 to
4 percent per year for nearly two decades. They have
overcome a 10-to-l inferiority in the central strategic
balance, having now reached essential equivalence. @:6£|
Confronted with these realities and with the resulting
impetus to bolster the NATO alliance, a new emphasis has
been placed on the term "collective capacity" which was
initially presented in Article 3 of the original Treaty.
The form of this emphasis closely resembles the original
task, outlined by those early committees, aimed at pro-
moting, "...the most efficient use of the resources of the
Alliance for the equipment and support of its forces.
"
{3:13QJ This emphasis derives a special significance from
the fact that bolstering the NATO Alliance presents an
economic burden that threatens to wreak havoc on the
17

consumer economies of the member nations. The U. S., no
less than Europe, is feeling the pressure of this demand
and accordingly has, in concert with its allies, embarked
on a policy of R/S&I.
B. THE PROBLEM
The difficulty faced by the U. S. DOD is that, while it
has begun to implement the precepts of the policy of R/S&I,
Congress has begun to ask many questions which indicate an
atmosphere of confusion regarding how to evaluate candidate
weapons systems. It appears that while the DOD is laboring
under the concept that R/S&I is a policy to be consistently
applied, Congress views it as a policy to be selectively
applied.
To demonstrate, Congress added the Culver-Nunn Amend-
ment to the DOD Appropriation Authorization Act for 1977
stating in part:
"...it is the policy of the U. S. that equipment procured
for the use of personnel of the Armed Forces of the United
States stationed in Europe *** should be standardized
or at least interoperable with equipment of other members
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." [6:10|
The amendment went on to require that:
"The Secretary of Defense shall, to the maximum feasible
extent initiate and carry out procurement procedures
that provide for the acquisition of equipment which is
standardized or interoperable." {6:1Q
This legislation permitted the Secretary of Defense to waive
the "Buy American" Act when he deemed it in the best interest
of the national defense.
18

To this end, the Secretary of Defense presented a report
to Congress regarding R/S&I within NATO. He stated:
"The DOD will vigorously pursue greater compatibility
of U. S. and Allied Forces to improve their ability to
operate effectively together and, to the extent feasible,
achieve more efficient Alliance resource utilization.
We will continue to emphasize rationalization/standardi-
zation and interoperability including, as appropriate,
increased purchases or license of Allied equipment." [2:3}
Despite the legislation and supporting rhetoric, Congress
has presented stiff opposition to recent large scale attempts
at R/S&I. The most notable of these being the Army's efforts
to acquire the Roland Missile System and the 120mm gun for
its new XM-1 tank. The form of this opposition strikes at
the very rationale for R/S&I, mainly its value to the U. S.
and NATO, and is most graphically presented in the findings
of the Special Subcommittee on NATO Standardization, Inter-
operability and Readiness. The committee found that:
"Obviously arms cooperation is not the total answer to
NATO • s problems
.
The discussion of potential savings is mostly theoreti-
cal, however. No witness who appeared before the sub-
committee suggested there would be any immediate savings
as a result of arms cooperation. As of now, it is impos-
sible to accurately predict whether arms cooperation will
save or cost money, either in the near future or in the
long run. This is not surprising since there is not even
a consensus on how to interpret data on cooperative
efforts to date. For example, there is no clear agree-
ment as to whether the "Americanization" of the Roland.
Missile System has saved or wasted defense dollars." (6:141
The committee went on to raise the major questions that it
felt must be answered regarding R/S&I:
"What are the economic benefits to be realized, and what
costs are acceptable to achieve these benefits? What are
the military benefits of implementing this policy? The
question of what military benefits are achievable leads
to an even broader question about whether immediate military
benefit to U. S, Forces should be sacrificed for political
solidarity . " (6 : 14}
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In. response, the Secretary of Defense proposed the
following criteria for measuring success in dealing with
NATO ' s problems
:
"Does it cost effectively strengthen NATO's capability
to deter or defend against Warsaw Pact attack? Does it
enhance or weaken NATO's political solidarity?" £§:15)
This, however, would appear to be a very difficult task
that cannot be approached on the basis of some broad wash
of the value of R/S&I. Rather, it is an effort which will
require constant review in order to accurately reflect the
priorities and realities of the time frame in which the
matter is being considered. This is true because of the
need to justify each candidate at several different stages
during both the DSARC and budget processes.
In other words:
"The question of how the Congress can best provide for
all of the defense requirements of the United States has
to be answered annually and the lack of any meaningful
measure of the benefits and costs of NATO standardization
and interoperability complicates the process." JB:1$1
General Alexander Haig stated that:
"...Each of these decisions must be an anguishing and
carefully worked out judgement of its own and a generalized
formula will get you in trouble. It depends on the pay-
off and the deficiency you are filling and how urgent it
is in the context of your broad strategic concerns." (6:15J
A complication that exists with the present environ-
ment is the fact that often, in the area of off-shore
procurement, the U. S. finds itself committed to a system or
component as a condition of trade-off agreements or of eco-
nomic and political concessions made in support of our own
Foreign Military Sales Program. For instance, one of the
20

conditions for the sale of the AWACS to the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany was the requirement that the U. S. purchase,
in return, "the 120mm tank gun, German equipment and labor
for installation of a new U. S. European Telephone System,
and purchase of German non-tactical vehicles." jj5:20J
The danger of such commitments is that the U. S. may
find that it must either buy a system that, upon deeper
analysis, does not meet its needs or that it may be forced
to renege on a commitment. Neither option is particularly
attractive to the U. S. or in its best interest. Thus, it
would be of great value if there existed a means for timely
and relevant screening of the off-set candidates prior to a
commitment being made.
With this in mind, DOD must look for more viable
approaches than the classical cost effectiveness one when
evaluating foreign manufactured systems. The classical
approach is inadequate with regard to the information needs
of Congress. Also, it is subject to many variables existent
in the European arms industry that were not considered when
it was formulated. The total spectrum of economics, politics,
strategy and military cost effectiveness must be considered
and presented by a useful approach.
To be most effective, the approach should lend itself to
varying levels of detail as required by the environment in
which it is being applied. It should be useful to national
representatives or political figures when screening candidate
European systems offered in exchange for our own sales abroad.
21

Thus, it should provide a framework upon which cursory evalua-
tion could be made based upon the values and variables which
ultimately will be dealt with in depth. On the other hand,
the same approach or model should provide the basis for a
more rigorous analysis that accounts not only for the require-
ments of regulations and quantitative objectives but addi-
tionally for the economic and political implications of the
acquisition as well. Such a model could satisfy many of the
needs of the DSARC and the Congress as well as the needs of
the statesman. This reconciliation and coordination by one
model could increase the likelihood that the U. S. will
pursue those programs and systems that give the most promise
of being acceptable. To that end, the remainder of this the-





There exist numerous instructions which, provide the pro-
ject manager and other decision makers with policy guidance
and the mechanics for acquiring weapon systems. These, by
establishing milestones at the critical decision junctures
and by delineating factors and cost estimating relationships
to be considered when evaluating a candidate system, provide
some assurance that the final selection accurately reflects
the needs of the defense establishment. However, these
instructions do not address the political and economic factors
of the broadened NATO thrust toward R/S&I.
There is little to suggest that the acquisition proce-
dure, as it now exists, needs to be restructured. Rather,
it appears that the process needs to be broadened in order
to assure that those factors which are now considered reflect
the political and economic realities of the NATO environment.
The credibility of the DOD cost estimators is suspect enough
when applied to the U. S. environment. Unless Congress can
be assured that the selection of a European candidate system,
or an alternative to such a candidate, adequately reflects the
broaxLened- environment implied, there is little reason to
expect Congress to have significant confidence in the choice.
23

With this in mind, we set out to develop a methodology
which might be useful in lending the "objectivity" that
various members of GAO and the Congress felt was lacking
in the current efforts to procure European weapon systems.
In so doing, it was hoped that the tunnel vision which moti-
vates some efforts as well as the "not invented here" syn-
drome which plagues others, might finally be laid to rest
and be replaced with a more logical approach.
B. THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH
The initial effort of this research aimed at developing
an estimating relationship from which one could predict
the degree of success that might reasonably be expected
from a candidate European system. The basic thrust involved
identifying as many pertinent variables as possible which,
when measured, could lend themselves to a proper regression
analysis and ultimately an estimating relationship. As shall
be pointed out, however, this proved to be a difficult task.
1. Identifying the Variables
Of primary concern was the assurance that no pertinent
variable would go untested. Thus, a brainstorming session
was arranged which brought together representatives of the
following disciplines: Systems Acquisition, Operations
Research, logistics and Economics. The list of variables
which resulted from that session is presented in Appendix A.
24

As one can readily see, there was no lack of ideas.
This reflects the philosophy shared by all present that
the effort would benefit more from a surfeit of variables,
that might not all prove significant, than from a conser-
vative list that might unwittingly exclude a very valuable
item.
V/hile it appeared that many of the variables would
indeed prove to be of little significance, a sound basis
for proceeding had been established. In fact, as was later
reinforced during subsequent interviews at Hughes Aircraft
Company, it was felt that to consider a variable and then
discard it for cause was a more creditable approach than
that of dismissing, out of hand, a variable without due con-
sideration.
2. Identifying the Systems
Having identified a list of potential variables,
it remained to identify what systems and subsystems of Euro-
pean design were currently in use in the U. S. Specifically,
it was desired that enough systems would be identified in
each of several technology categories to provide a suffi-
ciently large sample to be statistically significant.
It soon became apparent, however, that the U. S.
has very few operational systems of European design and
that those which are in use have accumulated a very limited
amount of operational data upon which to make an evaluation.
Thus, a problem of quantity arose. Additionally, those
systems which have been adopted are very diverse in nature
and, in a few instances, are so unique as to defy comparison.
25

a. The Problem of Quantity
While a plethora of projects are underway which
suggest a potential for a more significant presence of Euro-
pean technology within the U. S. inventory, at present that
presence is very small. For instance, the only systems or
subsystems presently fully operational, on a significant
scale, are the British made Harrier V/STOL jet, the Italian
Oto Molera (Mk-75, 76mm gun), the Mk-92 Fire Control System
(FCS) designed by SIGNAAL of the Netherlands, the 105mm
tank gun presently installed on the U. S. M60 series tanks,
numerous models of the British Martin ejection seat, and the
Belgian made MAG--58 machine gun.
While the raw quantity would be sufficient for
the purpose of a regression analysis, one could hardly say
that the systems involved display sufficient technological
commonality, in any respect, to be useful in providing an
estimating relationship for future systems of any specific
nature. Additionally, of those systems which do possess
sufficient operational data from which to make an evalua-
tion, specifically the Harrier, the 105mm gun, the Mk-75
gun and the Mk-92 FCS, all have been so heavily "Americanized"
during U. S. licensed production or retrofit as to render
any such evaluation suspect. This is particularly true with
regard to such variables as state-of-the-art, reliability,
quality control and production standards.
26

b. The Problem of Comparison
Aside from the lack of sufficient operational
data, there is the problem of finding suitable U. S.
systems against which to compare many of the above European
systems. This lack of comparability is not surprising.
Upon close examination one observes that it is often the
very unique nature of the European systems and subsystems
which has resulted in their purchase in the first place.
In the case of the Harrier, an aircraft which
followed an evolutionary R&D effort unlike that of any other
airplane in the world and one which demonstrates very unique
flight characteristics, the U. S. gained an operational
system, free of any significant R&D investment, with which
to test and evaluate an operational capability. This oppor-
tunity presented itself despite the fact that no such system
existed in the U. S.
As was determined by the Senate Subcommittee on
Close Air Support during hearings to evaluate the validity of
the concurrent development of the Air Force's A-X (A-10),
the Army's Cheyenne helicopter and procurement of the
Harrier (AY-8A):
"There does not appear to the subcommittee to be a valid
issue of duplication between the Harrier and the A-X fixed
wing aircraft. The subcommittee sees the Harrier program
as primarily an experiment to evaluate the operational
utility of Y/STOI fixed wing aircraft The Harrier
program does offer the chance to obtain true operational
experience with YTOL squadrons. In view of the emphasis
being placed on future YTOL aircraft in the Navy, with its
air-capable ship concept, as well as in the Marines for
close support attack aircraft, the subcommittee recommends
that the Harriers procured be used to evaluate these con-
cepts of operation." [7:25-261
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Similarly, the Oto Molera gun is a unique candi-
date which provides an operational capability, if not a new
technology, not currently available in the U. S. and one
which otherwise would have required a significant investment
in design and start-up costs. As was indicated during inter-
views with NATO PHM Ship Acquisition Project personnel and
with Oto Molera Project personnel, the gun, as well as the
Mk-92 PCS, represent an evolutionary development of weapons
systems suitable for use on small coastal and medium range
patrol craft.
This area of interest had long lain dormant in
the U. S. due to its emphasis on a "blue water" Navy and
its globe skirting ships capable of mounting large bore guns
with their scaled up fire control systems. To institute
a design effort aimed at filling the need for more compact
systems suitable for craft such as the PHM and FPG-7 class
ships would have required a significant investment by DOD.
As for the Martin Baker ejection seats, they
represent a tradition which is almost proprietary in nature
and has only recently been tentatively challenged by U. S.
aerospace firms. Therefore, there is little of U. S.
design or manufacture against which to compare the seats.
To emphasize that the role of uniqueness is not
peculiar to the military acquisition process, one need only
observe some of the major acquisitions made by the civilian
industry. Por instance, the purchase of the A-300 Airbus
by Eastern airlines acknowledges not only a very attractive
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financial arrangement offered by Airbus Industries but the
fact that, as yet, medium range wide body jets are only
just entering the prototype stage in the U. S. aerospace
industry. Also Foss Tug's choice of the Motoren-und Turbinen-
Union (MTU) marine engine for its new tug boats reflects
the fact that the majority of the U. S. marine engines are
heavy marinized land engines which do not produce anywhere
near the horsepower to weight ratio of European marine
diesels.
C. A CHANGE OP DIRECTION
It became apparent then that little existed in the way
of classifiable and comparative data from which to collect
sufficient information to perform a neat and sanitary regres-
sion analysis such as was envisioned. There does not exist
at this time sufficient quantity or depth of systems in the
U. S. to provide the correlation necessary to develop any man-
ner of reliable or even statistically significant estimating
relationship.
Being aware that this conclusion in no way diminished
the fact that a problem still exists and being convinced
that there is always more than one way to approach a problem,
a search began for a new tack.
As was indicated earlier, while Congress has not opposed
the principle of R/S&I, it has questioned the concept and
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has taken aim at several individual weapons such as the
120mm gun and Roland on the basis of economic, political
and military value. As one study indicated:
"The Congress has taken collective action in support of
NATO standardization and interoperability. However, they
still may resist individual purchases for a variety of
reasons. The primary reasons usually relate to protection
of U. S. industry and to whether the purchase is in the
best interests of the U. S. militarily." /8:23j
Having failed to develop an empirically predictive model,
the effort seemed logically to focus on developing a con-
ceptual model that would provide a framework for addressing
those areas of impact which are of the most concern to the
Department of Defense and the Congress, namely military,
economic and political. The model that was formulated con-
sisted of fourteen variables. It is presented in Appendix B.
These fourteen variables represent those items which
experience, reading and research suggested were the more
significant of the variables currently considered as well
as those which were most often responsible for Congressional
skepticism regarding candidate European systems. Once they
were identified, another brainstorming session, representing
the disciplines noted earlier, was organized to discuss and
refine the variables. As a result of this session, the
following grouping of four broad conceptual categories or
issue areas was identified:
T
x
: CHANGES IN NATO DEFENSE CAPABILITY
Y
2
: REAL U. S. COSTS
Y^: ECONOMIC EFFECTS
Y, : POLITICAL BENEFITS4
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Several variables were combined or deleted while two
additional variables, Operating Costs and Royalties, were
added. This model was then presented to Dr. Ellen Frost,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Economic
Affairs, and to Dr. Stewart Blakely, formerly of Stanford
Research Institute, and an international authority on R&D
management. Next, it was presented to Dr. Leonard G-rosse
and Dr. Howard Laitin of Hughes Aircraft, Dr. Reiner Huber,
Professor of Applied Systems Science in the Computer
Science Department of the Hochschule der Bunderswher
Munchen, and to members of the systems acquisition staff
of GAO for critique and comment. Their recommendations
and insights led to the final form of the model as





As indicated in the previous chapter, the model repre-
sents several iterations and one false start. Thus, it is
one which has evolved from a great deal of thought and
research. As such, it represents not only a methodology
but a perspective of what are the broader vital issues to
be considered when evaluating a system or component of Euro-
pean manufacture or design.
The model addresses the concern raised by Congressman
Prank Horton (Rep N. Y. ) when he stated:
"In short, we must be ready to answer the political and
economic questions that can be expected when we purchase
a European weapon system for an American system. We must
likewise be willing to deal with the military questions
that can be expected when we buy a European system instead
of a possibly superior American system." (9:3A
In this respect, the model addresses four main issue
areas. It provides a logical framework for identifying and
addressing the relevant issues that should be addressed
prior to any initial statements of intent. Also, these
same issue areas, when analyzed more rigorously as better
estimates become available, provide the framework required
to anticipate the information requirements of the later stages
of the DSARC process and of the Congressional review process.
It is intended that by consistently applying this frame-
work, albeit with varying degrees of intensity and thorough-
ness, in concert with existing regulations, one can reasonably
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expect that the issues of R/S&I can be successfully
resolved during the acquisition process. In addition,
it is intended that this model will provide a degree of
"objectivity" which presently is lacking due to the narrow
scope of present procedures and to emotions of the NIH
Syndrome which now permeate the decision environment.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
It should be noted at this point that the model does
not address the determination of performance characteristics.
It assumes that these are known or have been estimated.
Rather, the model addresses those items of environment
which, as has been indicated, may weigh heavily on the deci-
sion process.
Finally, the model is designed to consider each varia-
ble exclusive of the others. That is, no variable has an
element in common with any other variable. And, in all
instances, the model presumes a present value analysis of all
costs and benefits.
C. THE STRUCTURE
Exhibit 1 and the following sections present each varia-
ble of the model in depth and explains how each is applied,
whether used during the screening process or during the
latter stages of the decision cycle. Two hypothetical
applications are described in Chapter IT. At Milestone
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of the DSAKC process a scalar value will be assigned. later
in the acquisition cycle, monetary costs (benefits) can be
assigned to many of the variables.
The assignment of scalar values will require that the
decision maker determine the scale to be used, i.e. one-to-
five (1-5), one-to-ten (1-10) or even zero-to-one thousand
(0-1000). The scale chosen will depend on the degree of
precision available and on the confidence the decision
maker has in his ability to meaningfully assign these
values. The spread between the assigned values for competing
systems for a particular variable are of more significance
than the values themselves. The scalar values are not




Value/Cost = f (Y-^ Tg, Y,, Yj
Where Y, = Changes in NATO defense capability
and Y
x
= f (X-^ Xg, Xj, X
+
)
Where X-, = Effectiveness
Xp = Timeliness of availability
X, = Aggregate defense systems vulnerability
X. = Integration at battlefield level
Where Yp = Real U. S. costs
and Y2 = f (Xc> Xg, Xrjf Xg, Xg, X^q)
Where X,- = Development value/ cost
Xg = Production value/cost
X~ = Force logistics value/cost
Xg = Data transfer value/cost
Xq = Operational value/ cost
X-.Q 3 Royalty value/cost
Where Y, = Economic effects
and Y
3
= f (Iu , X12 , X13 )
Where X-,-, = Value/cost of export sales
X12 = Value/cost of off-sets
X^ = Balance of payments value/cost
X-,. = Effect on U. S. labor force




1. Y-, ; Changes in NATO Defense Capability :
The first of four issue areas is intended to measure
the effect the selection of a candidate weapon system will
have on the ability of NATO (including the U. S. ) to defend
itself from attack. The issue area is divided into four
sub-variables which together account for the major considera-
tions affecting this capability. Due to difficulties in esti-
mating these areas in monetary terms at any phase of the
acquisition process, scalar values will be used throughout
for variables X-, through X..
a. X-, = Effectiveness:
This variable is intended to estimate the
effectiveness of the system based on its ability to perform
some mission as defined by the MENS.
b. Xp = Timeliness of Availability:
This variable will be assigned a scalar value,
which represents the estimated defense capability (gain or
loss) that will be realized due to the system being avail-
able earlier or later than the time frame established by
the MENS.
c. X^ = Aggregate Defense Systems Vulnerability:
This variable is intended to estimate the change
in vulnerability in aggregate defense capability resulting
from the duplicative/non-duplicative result of adoption of
the system. Eor example, three somewhat duplicative systems,
such as the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA), the E-15 and
the F-16 present the enemy with a broader band of performance
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capabilities to counter than would deployment of any one
of these systems. Thus, selection of any one or two systems
would increase aggregate defense systems vulnerability,
resulting in a relatively low value for this variable.
d. X. = Integration at Battlefield Level:
Estimate the suitability of the candidate to
the battlefield commander, considering interface problems
such as Command, Control and Communications (C ).
2. Y
2
; Real U. S. Costs
The second of the four issue areas is intended to
provide the decision maker with a basis for comparing what
real (out of pocket) costs will be incurred by the U. S.
as a result of purchasing competing systems. This issue
area is subdivided into six sub-variables. Scalar values
will be assigned at Milestone while monetary costs may be
used later.
a. Xe = Development Value/Cost:
This variable is aimed at estimating or evaluating
the value/cost that will be realized in the R&D community
as a result of selecting a particular candidate. If the
selection results in the potential for reallocating R&D
monies or for reducing the R&D budget, a net savings results.
At Milestone 0, this would result in a high (favorable) valus,
while at Milestone II, for example, a negative monetary
cost (i.e., a savings) would result.
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b. Xg = Production Value/Cost:
This variable aims at estimating program pro-
duction costs as a result of the decision to acquire one or
another candidate. It presumes that learning curves and
rates of expenditures are taken into consideration.
c. Xr, = Porce logistics Value/Cost:
This variable assigns a value or a cost to the
estimated support requirement required for all units of the
candidate system. It is appropriate to consider any and
all of the items of Life Cycle Costs that fall under the
heading of Support.
d. Xg = Data Transfer Value/Cost:
During the screening process, an attempt will
be made to determine if data transfer costs will exist.
During later review (e.g., Milestone II), an attempt will
be made to determine what these costs will be.
e. Xq = Operational Value/Cost:
This variable assigns a value or a cost to the
estimated operational requirements of the candidate. It is
appropriate to consider any and all of the items of life Cycle
Costs that fall under the heading of Operational Costs.
f. X1Q = Royalty Value/Cost:
During the screening process, it is necessary
only to determine if licensing or royalty costs will be
incurred. In the later stages of the decision process,




3. Y,: Economic Effects
—d
a. X-,-, = Export Sales Value/Cost:
During the screening process, an attempt will
"be made to determine if any export potential exists with each
candidate offered. During the later review process, an
attempt will be made to estimate what this potential is
in dollars. Any gain in exports will be treated as a bene-
fit (large scalar value) or negative monetary cost.
b. X12 = Off-Sets Value/Cost:
An attempt will be made to determine if the
candidate has a potential for satisfying any off-set obli-
gations of the U. S. During the screening process, a scalar
value will be assigned accordingly. In later reviews, a
monetary estimate of the benefit of such an off-set may be
made and assigned.
c. X-,, = Balance of Payments Value/Cost:
An attempt will be made to assess the potential
effect on the U, S. balance of payments deficit. A value
will be placed on this estimated impact for the screening
process, while a dollar estimate will be made upon later
review.
d. X-,. = Effect on U. S. labor Force:
Each candidate should be evaluated in light of
the job impact its selection will have on the labor force
as a whole. In later stages, this may be evaluated in terms
of the dollar impact the decision has on the economy.
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4. Y .; Political Benefits
Whether using the model as a screen or as a basis
for broadening the decision process during the latter stages
of the DSARC cycle, this variable will emphasize the role that
political priorities play in the ultimate decision and selec-
tion. In neither case will a value be assigned to the poli-
tical benefits. Rather the realities of current priorities
will be considered and the opinions of cognizant members
of the DOD and the Armed Services Committees will be considered.
It now remains to utilize this framework to aid in
the decision process and to supplement the processes now
in use. The following chapter will apply the model to both
the screening process and the later DSARC processes involved





As has "been indicated, the degree of rigor which will
"be applied when using the model will be a function of the
magnitude and complexity of the system or program which is
under consideration. Additionally, it will reflect the
environment in which the model is applied. That is, the
model will require a great deal more research and rigor to
meet the needs of DSARC II or III than would be the case
when being utilized as a screen at the DSARC or I level.
To provide an example of how this would be done in each
environment, two sample systems will be evaluated and then
compared to one another. In the first instance, an example
of how the model would be applied as a screen will be
addressed, while in the second, the rigor needed to satisfy
later DSARC and Congressional requirements will be presented.
It is appropriate to remind the reader that in actual
application, the model assumes that a MENS has been accepted
which makes evaluation of the candidates a valid exercise.
It is not the function of the model to establish the need
for a system. Nor is it the function of the model to deter-
mine the performance characteristics of the candidates.
Rather, the model applies known or estimated performance
factors in determining the impact they will have on the
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given issue area and variables. Also, it is important to
remember that each variable is exclusive with regard to the
other variables in the model in that no part of what is
being estimated by one variable is included in what is being
estimated by another.
While the U. S. is not currently actively participating
in the evaluations presented, the possibility of such an
evaluation is not at all remote. All that is lacking to
make the following scenario a reality is the need for an
approved MENS.
B. THE BATTLEFIELD SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
For the sake of discussion, assume that two systems are
being considered as candidates for a new battlefield sur-
veillance system. One of these is a satellite system of U. S.
design and manufacture while the other, a rotary wing remotely
piloted vehicle (HPT), is of European design and is offered
for licensed co-production in the U. S.
Those tasked with screening the proposed systems for
possible development would need to perform a certain amount
of preparatory research to aid them in their contacts with
the respective contractors as well as, in the case of the
NATO ally, the host government. The depth of this research
would depend on the amount of time and information available
and on the degree of definition and precision available
from the contractors during this phase.
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It is likely that the systems would be lacking suffi-
cient definition to permit budget caliber estimates. Thus,
it is anticipated that the values assigned each candidate,
that is, to each variable, will be scalar in nature rather
than monetary. These values will be derived from past ex-
perience with similar systems, export opinion, and whenever
possible, manufacturer's data or estimates.
The values assigned will be relative in nature and will
range from a low value of one (1) to a high value of ten (10).
Each candidate will be evaluated on its own merit and ability
to satisfy the MENS. Once this has been done, a comparison







The reader will remember from the previous chapter that
the model consists of four main issue areas, each of which
may consist of several variables. As the following example
will demonstrate, each of these variables will be assigned
an estimated value which can be, in turn, used to compare




Y-, : Changes in NATO Defense Capability:
X-, = Effectiveness:
Compare the known or estimated performance
capabilities of each system with regard
to required mission capability.
The evaluation may estimate that the
satellite rates a value of (7) while the
RPV rates a value of (8).
The RPV is marginally better than the
satellite.
Xp = Timeliness of Availability:
Evaluate the estimated time to Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) of the two
candidates and estimate the effect on
defense capability benefit/loss.
Assuming that the design and production
of a satellite system may require all of
an allocated five year time frame, it may
rate a value of ( 5;
.
The RPV on the other hand, may require
only three years to field and be awarded
a value of (8)
.
The RPV is more attractive (better) than
the satellite in this area.
%-z = Aggregate Defense Systems Vulnerability:
Estimate the change in vulnerability of tie
aggregate defense capability resulting from
selection of the candidate.
Since the aggregate defense capability
resulting from selection of the satellite
will be very hard for the enemy to counter,
it may be assigned a high value of (10).
The aggregate defense capability resulting
from adoption of the RPV is determined to be
fairly easily countered. Thus, the RPV is
awarded a value of (4).




Estimate the suitability of the candidate
to the battlefield commander, considering
interface problems, such as Command, Con-
trol and Communications.
The satellite is estimated to impose no
burden on existing systems. It is awarded
a value of (10)
.
It is anticipated that the RPV will place
an increased interface load on existing
systems or improvements in order to obtain
the required reconnaissance information.
It is awarded a value of (3).
The satellite is superior to the RPV.
Y
2
: Real U. S. Costs:
Xc- = Development Value:
Estimate the value of each candidate in
relation to the resulting efficiency of
the U. S. R&D effort.
It may be estimated that developing the
satellite will require that the R&D budget
be increased or that funds be reallocated
from current programs. A value of (5) is
awarded.
Acquisition of the RPY will require no
increase in the R&D budget and will pro-
vide the additional benefit of permitting
current RPY and satellite efforts to be
channeled into more lucrative areas.
Thus, a value of (10) is awarded.
The RPY is better than the satellite.
Xg: Production Value:
Assign a value to each candidate with
regard to the estimated total production
program cost of each.
A significant front end investment will be
required for the satellite which will
result in funding shortfalls for other
systems or the need to significantly in-




Xg = Production Value (cont)
The iront end cost of the RPV is very low.
A value of (10) is awarded to the RPV
candidate.
The RPV is superior in this area.
Xj = logistics Value:
Relative to the estimated support costs,
what is the value of each candidate?
It is estimated that support costs for
the satellite will be very low since no
on-system maintenance is required. It is
awarded a value of (9).
The RPV will require a large amount of
on-system maintenance which will result
in fairly high support costs. A value
of (3) is awarded.
The satellite is superior to the RPV.
Xq = Data Transfer Value:
Assign a value to each candidate based on
the estimated complexity of any technology
transfer efforts and the resulting cost.
The satellite will have no data transfer
cost. A maximum value of (10) is awarded.
The RPV will require significant data
transfer efforts. It is awarded a value
of (4).
The satellite is superior to the RPV.
Xq = Operational Value:
Award a value based on the estimated cost
of operating the candidate.
Operational costs for the satellite will
be confined to the cost of assigning an
additional communicator to the appropriate




Xq = Operational Value (cont)
Operational costs for the RPV will
reflect the need for numerous operators
and maintainers.
Therefore, a value of (2) is awarded.
The satellite is superior to the RPV.
X-.Q = Royalty Value:
What is the value of the candidate based
on the estimated license and royalty costs
that will "be incurred?
The satellite will have several sub-systems
which will be directly purchased from
Europe which entail no royalty costs. A
value of (10) is awarded.
The RPV will incur royalty costs as a
result of licensed coproduction in the
U. S. They are not significant, however.
A value of (8) is awarded.
The satellite is marginally better than
the RPV.
r~: Economic Effects:
Xll ~ ^' s * E^P01"^ Sales Value:
What is the value of the export potential
the candidate represents?
The satellite is expected to have little,
if any, export potential. A value of (l)
is awarded.
The RPV is expected to generate a large
third country export potential. A value
of (10) is awarded.
The RPV is exceptionally superior to the
satellite.
X12 = off_sets Value:
What is the value of each candidate in
light of U. S. off-set obligations?
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X12 = 0ff"set3 Value (cont)
The satellite will satisfy no off-set
obligations. A value of (1) is awarded.
The RPV will satisfy a large off- set
obligation. A value of (10) is awarded.
The RPV is exceptionally superior to the
satellite.
X-,, = Balance of Payments Value:
What is the value of each candidate in
regard to the U. S. balance of payments?
The satellite will generate an outflow of
dollars associated with the sub-system
procurement and will generate no export
potential. The resulting deficit increase
merits a value of (4).
The RPV will generate an outflow associated
with the licensing costs. A value of (1)
is awarded.
The satellite is better than the RPV.
X-,. = U. S. Labor Force Value:
What is the value of each candidate to the
U. S. labor force?
The satellite is not expected to generate
any significant increase in jobs in the
aerospace industry due to the small numbers
required and due to the existing excess
capacity in the industry. A value of (3)
is awarded.
Due to the numbers that are required, the
RPV is expected to generate an increase in
labor requirements. A value of (9) is
awarded.
The RPV is superior to the satellite.
r,: Political Benefits:
4
The values assigned in regard to political
benefits are elusive and vary with the priorities
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Y.: Political Benefits (cont)
of the moment. They must "be considered, how-
ever. The appropriate members of DOD or of
the Armed Services Committees should be polled.
The "political normative override" will come
into play at this point.
2. The Comparison
It is of extreme importance that the evaluator be
aware that in making the comparison that is now warranted,
no attempt should "be made to total the values assigned to the
candidate in the many variable areas. Since each issue area
and each variable impact differently on the decision because
of their relative importance, they are not additive in
nature. Any attempt to total the values will negate the
fact that a rating of "superior" in one area may well be
overshadowed by a rating of "better" in a more important
area. Rather, the evaluator should only compare the ratings
for the candidate systems by variable .
To facilitate the comparison, the following array of





Yl ! xl M. B. (Effectiveness Value)
x2





h B. (Capability Value)
Y2 : X5
B. (Development Value)
x6 s. (Production Value)
1, S. (Logistics Value)
h s. (Data Transfer Value)
h s. (Operational Value)
X10 M. B. (Royalty Value)
Y
3
: xll E. S. (Export Value)
X12 E. S. (Off-set Value)
X13 B. (BOP Value)
XH s. (Labor Value)
I.: The "political normative override"
Key M. B. Marginally Better
B. Better
S. Superior
E. S. Exceptionally Superior
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C. THE ASW AIRCRAFT
Having examined how the model might be applied as a
screen, it now remains to view the model as it might be
applied at Milestone II and subsequent reviews. It is at
this point that the major effort must be applied when
using the model and that the information needs of the
reviewing bodies must be fully anticipated. Therefore, the
rigor and precision required and sought understandably will
be more substantial.
For this example, the model will be applied to evaluate
two candidates offered to meet the need for a new Anti-
submarine Warfare (ASW) aircraft. One will be a jet pro-
pelled replacement for the P-3C Orion airplane while the
other will be a technologically advanced airship of European
design.
The projected airplane will have a cruise speed of 425
knots, a payload of 150,000 pounds, an on-station time of
5 hours and a mission radius of 900 miles. The proposed
airship will be designed to fly 100 knots, carry a payload
of 270,000 pounds, remain on-station for up to 500 hours
and have a 2,500 mile mission radius.
It is anticipated that a great deal more definition
and estimating precision will be available at this point
than at Mileston 0. Thus, well established Life Cycle Cost
models and empirically derived Cost Estimating Relationships




To preclude clouding the example by using spurious
dollar values, monetary units will be assigned in each
case. The reader will recognize that the appropriate
dollar values would apply in the following example.
1. The Example
Y-,: Changes in NATO Defense Capability:
X-, = Effectiveness:
The effectiveness of the airplane compared
with the MENS results in award of a (6).
The airship is awarded an (8) in this
area.
Xp = Timeliness of Availability:
The airplane is estimated to be opera-
tional prior to the maximum allowed time
and is awarded a (9).
Due to the fact that some rather innova-
tive design changes to the classic model
are necessary, it is estimated the airship
will require all of the allotted time
resulting in an award of a (3).
X* = Aggregate Defense System Vulnerability:
The aggregate defense vulnerability re-
sulting from retention of fixed wing air-
craft is not significantly altered.
Awarded a ( 5 )
.
The airship is considered fairly vulnerable
to attack.
Aggregate defense vulnerability is increased.
Awarded a (2)
X. = Integration Suitability:
Each system will be able to operate within






: Real U. S. Costs:
Xc = Development Costs:
What is the dollar impact each candidate
will have on the efficiency of the U. S.
R&D effort?
It is estimated that the airplane will
require an increase or reallocation of
10 monetary units in the R&D budget.
The airship will require no increase in
current R&D budget. Additionally, the
experience gained would have cost 5 mone-
tary units in the U. S. R&D budget. This
is recognized as a net savings of 5 mone-
tary units. (-5)
Xg = Production Cost:
Estimate the program production cost of
each candidate.
It is estimated that the airplane will
have a cumulative average cost of 10 mone-
tary units per plane. This represents a
cost of 1000 monetary units.
The airship is estimated to have a cumula-
tive average cost of 11 monetary units
each for a cost of 935 monetary units for
85 airships.
Xrj = Force logistics Costs:
What are the estimated support costs of
each candidate?
The present value life Cycle Support Cost
of the airplane is estimated at 10,000
monetary units.
The airship will have an estimated Life
Cycle Support Cost estimated at 5,000
monetary units.
Xg = Data Transfer Costs:
What are the estimated data transfer costs?
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Xg = Data Transfer Costs (cont)
There will be no data transfer costs for
the airplane.
The airship will require a data transfer
expenditure of 20 monetary units.
Xq = Operational Costs:
What are the estimated operational ICC
s
for each candidate?
It is estimated that the present value
operational LCC of the airplane will be
7,000 monetary units.
The airship is estimated to have a present
value operational ICC of 4,000 monetary
units.
X10 = Royalty Costs:
What are the royalty costs associated with
each candidate?
There will be none for the airplane.
The propulsion and stabilization system of
the airship will be licensed for production
in the U. S. and will incur a royalty cost
of 5 monetary units.
r,: Economic Effects:
Xll
= Effect on u » s « E^P ^ Sales:
What is the cost effect of each candidate's
export potential?
The airplane is estimated to have the
potential to generate 500 monetary units
in export credits. This represents a
savings of 500 monetary units. (-500)
The airship will likewise generate third
country sales. However, it will be in
competition with the designing country
resulting in estimated export credits of
300 monetary units. (-300)
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X12 = Effect on U ' S * Off-sets:
What costs are associated with, either
candidate's potential for satisfying
U. S. off-set obligations?
The airplane will not satisfy any off-set
obligations.
The airship will satisfy 50 monetary units
of off-set obligations for a net savings.
(-50)
X-,, = Effect on Balance of Payments:
What effect will each candidate have on
the U. S. balance of payments?
There will be no net increase in the BOP
deficit due to acquiring the airplane.
The airship will generate a 15 monetary
unit increase in the BOP deficit.
X14 = Effect on U. S. labor Force:
What is the monetary effect of either
candidate on the labor force?
Development of the airplane will demand
only a 10 percent increase in the use of
present production capacity for a net con-
tribution of 6 monetary units. (-6)
Development of the airship will result in
the need for an entirely unique production
capability which will generate a 20 percent
increase in production capacity for a net
contribution of 10 monetary units. (-10)
Y„: Political Benefits:
4
No monetary value can be placed on political
benefits. It will remain to apply the political
evaluation during the sensitivity analysis.
What would be of value at this point is an esti-
mate of what range of cost differences might




With, the above estimates in hand, it only remains
to perform a sensitivity analysis to determine which of the
candidates is more attractive. Here again the tendency is
to sum the values in order to obtain a total cost figure
for each of the candidates. The ability to do so is some-
what clouded since the relative importance of the variables
in the aggregate is not clear. It also is not clear if the
costs or values associated with each of the issue areas are
the same in nature since in one case the cost may represent
"out of pocket" costs, while in the other, it may represent
an opportunity cost. Whatever the inclination of the evalua-
tors, a great deal of caution must be exercised when summing
the costs. For this comparison, Y2 and Y, will be summed
and Y-, and Y. will be assumed to play a weighting role in
the comparison.
Again, an array will be constructed to facilitate the




















































Y.: The "political normative override"
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As can be seen, a basis for comparison is established.
It will be left to the reader to perform such a comparison
since the decision may vary significantly depending on the
significance placed on each of the many variables. For
instance, it is not clear if the higher cost associated
with the airplane in area Y~ is significant when viewed in
the light of the generally better rating the plane received
in Y-j. Likewise, political realities may be of such signifi-
cance that the spread of values in each variable area is not




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The time has long since past when the U. S. can consider
itself the -undisputed purveyor to the arsenals of the free
world. The realities of fiscal constraint and resource
limitations, coupled with the emergence of a technically
advanced and efficient European arms industry dictate that
the U. S. must increasingly participate in, and foster, an
environment which embraces the "two-way street.
"
Likewise, those same realities necessitate an ever
growing environment of cooperation and coordination among
the NATO allies. Increasingly, these allies must strive
for a commonality of means as well as purpose if the capa-
bility of the alliance is to remain more than just a paper
tiger.
The concept of R/S&I appears to have met with a con-
census in theory, if not in practice. As is the case with
any useful theory, it is the final hurdle, implementation,
which generally proves to be the more difficult obstacle.
In the U. S., the hurdle of implementation resists being
consistently cleared not because of any lingering sense of
nationalism, not because of a "not invented here" bias, and
not because of any serious fear of industrial competition.
Rather, it resists total acceptance because of too little
definition and too much emotion.
59

Congress wants to be assured that DOD is not taking
too narrow a view of R/S&I. Of particular concern is the
view that. "International arms cooperation encompasses
political and economic considerations beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the Department of Defense alone." (6:2) This leads
to the conclusion that a broadened evaluative model is
required that encompasses the economic and political factors
in addition to those of military effectiveness.
For this to be accomplished, however, one must first
accept that the R/S&I environment in which the U. S. must
compete is exceedingly more diverse than the one DOD cur-
rently functions in and is subject to a broadened and more
elusive set of variables. These variables must be taken
into account when making the acquisition decision.
The model developed in Chapter III is submitted as a
point of departure, at the very least. It attempts to lend
the objectivity, the focus and the broadened perspective
necessary to perform a valid analysis of competing candi-
dates from throughout the NATO community. By applying it
in conjunction with current evaluative procedures, it is
expected that the DOD and Congress will experience few
instances of disagreement regarding the specific systems
chosen in support of the R/S&I concept.
There are those who would say that all one need do
is reverse the procedures recommended to U. S. allies
when they procure arms under the Foreign Military Sales
60

Program. This procedure would perhaps serve well in success-
fully supporting a system once purchased. However, it
totally ignores the more basic problems of economics and
politics.
It is concluded that in order to avail itself of any
potential benefits of the "two-way street" approach to
R/S&I, the U. S. must realize that the task is not an easy
one. The DOD will have to do its homework and will have to
insure that only those candidates which, in addition to
their military value, offer the greatest benefit economically
and politically will be nominated for acquisition. Only
then can one reasonably expect that a consistent application
and a concensus of objective between DOD and Congress can
be achieved regarding R/S&I.
To that end, the model is presented as a framework
within which to work. It is not immutable in its form, nor
is it all encompassing. It is recognized that the variables
may well change to reflect the nature and form of the dif-
ferent candidates to which it may well be applied in the
future. None the less, the four major Issue Areas of the
model should provide the basic framework for the majority
of the possible candidates. Likewise, the variables pre-
sented are expected to change more significantly with regard




First, it is recommended that this model be used as
a check list in evaluating European developed candidates
for U. S. acquisition.
Second, it is recommended that evaluation/rating tech-
niques acceptable to the various government agencies
involved in the acquisition process (e.g. DOD, Congress,
State Department, Treasury, labor, etc) be developed.
Finally, it is recommended that a body of experts be
identified which possesses the necessary information and








1. U. S. Candidates
2. U. S. Design - Foreign Produced
3. Foreign Design - IT. S. Produced
4. Foreign design - Foreign Produced








1. Availability in U. S. Industry























H. SIMILARITY OF MAINTENANCE STRUCTURE
1. Maintenance Echelon
2. Skill Differences
I. DIFFERENCES IN DESIGN AND TEST STANDARDS
J. SYSTEM MATURITY











A Conceptual Model to Estimate the Net Benefit (Cost) of
Purchasing a Foreign Developed Defense System or Subsystem
14
Benefit (Cost) = ^X.
i-1
^
Where X-, = Utility of additional (lost) defense capa-
bility due to early (late) availability
Xp = Avoided (additional) U. S. development
costs
X-z = Reduced (additional) procurement costs
X. = Reduced (additional) logistics costs
Xc = Inflationary savings (loss) due to early
or late purchase
Xg = Effect on other U. S. sales (off-sets)
X7 = Impact of changes in availability
Xq = Political benefits to appropriate alliance
Xq = Value of gained export rights
X,q = Reduced R&D capability
X-,-, = Economic effect of outflow of U. S. dollars
X-,p = Utility of increased enemy capability to
counter one vice two systems
X-,, = Data translation costs
X-j. = Economic costs of civilian exports lost due





1. Bergquist, John Roy, Acquisition of Foreign
Produced Products; A Government and Industry
Perspective , M.S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, Ca. , 1979
2. Brown, Harold, Rationalization/Standardization
Within NATO. A report to the United States Congress,
tsw.
3. NATO Information Services, Second Impression,
NATO, Facts and Figures , Brussels, Belguim, 1978
4. Perry, William J., "New Directions for NATO,"
Defense Systems Management Review , Vol. 1,
No. 7-«. Ft. BelvoirJ Va. , Autumn, 1978
5. Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General
of the United States, PSAD-78-2, Standardization in
NATO: Improving the Effectiveness and Economy of
Mutual Defense Efforts , 197%
6. Report of the Special Subcommittee on NATO
Standardization, Interoperability and Readiness
of the Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, H. A. S. C. No. 95-101, NATO
Standardization, Interoperability and Readiness
,
Mar., 19Y9
7. Report of the Special Subcommittee on Close Air
Support of the Committee on Armed Services, United
States Senate, S 202-6 CAS, New Close Air Support
Hardware Systems , 1972
8. Williams, William B., Perry, Virginia W. , and Candy,
Harold F., NATO Standardization and Interoperability
Handbook of Lessons Learned , U. S. Army Procurement
Research Office, U. S. Army Logistics Management
Center, Ft. Lee, Va. , 1978
9. Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Government Operations, House of Representatives,
Problems in the Standardization and Interoperability





1. Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria , Yirginia 2 2 3 14
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
3. Department Chairman, Code 54(JS) 1
Department of Administrative Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
4. Adjunct Professor David N. Burt, Code 54(BV) 1
Department of Administrative Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
5. Assistant Professor David V. Lamm 54(LT) 2
Department of Administrative Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
6. Capt. Ross J. Hieb 1
Rt. 2, Box 390












3 2768 002 05971 9
OUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
